Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 11
Issue 1
Symposium: Parent and Child in North American
Family Law

Article 4

3-4-1997

"Rights of Custody" Under the Hague Convention
Martha Bailey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Martha Bailey, "Rights of Custody" Under the Hague Convention, 11 BYU J. Pub. L. 33 (1997).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol11/iss1/4

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

"Rights of Custody" Under the Hague Convention
Martha Bailey*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction 1 clearly distinguishes between the remedies available to protect "rights of custody," and those available to protect "rights of access."
An order for the return of a child to the country of her or his habitual residence will be made only to enforce rights of custody. The Convention
protects rights of access without an order of return. However, in some
circumstances, an "access parent" may be considered to hold rights of
custody and thus be entitled to an order for the child's return under the
Convention. 2 Courts in various jurisdictions have ruled that access parents have rights of custody within the Convention's meaning if the custodial parent may not legally move with the child to another jurisdiction
absent the access parent's consent or a court order. This article argues
that these assorted courts correctly interpret the Convention.
In addition, it critically discusses the Canadian Supreme Court's
anomalous approach to the issue in two recent decisions, Thomson v.
Thomson and V. W. v. D.S. In those decisions, the related issue of a
custodial parent's relocation rights was analyzed by the Canadian
Supreme Court. The distinctive views of two members of the Supreme
Court of Canada on that issue underpin the Court's atypical interpretation

* Copyright © 1997 by Martha Bailey. LL.B. (Toronto), LL.M. (Queen's), Assistant
Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
I. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 19 I.L.M. 1501
(1980) [hereinafter the Convention].
2. Throughout this paper I will use the term "custodial parent" to mean the parent with
day-to-day care and control of the child, and "access parent" to mean a parent who does not have
day-to-day care and control. But the meaning of these terms under the domestic laws of
contracting states varies. Some contracting parties have abandoned the use of the terms "custody"
and "access" altogether and have moved to a continuing shared parental responsibility model. See,
e.g., Family Law Reform Act, No. 167 of 1995 (Austl.); Children Act, vol. 4 ch. 41 (U.K. 1989)
(Eng. and Wales); Children Act. ch. 36 (U.K. 1995) (Scot.); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 214,
752 (West 1964). Contracting states can abandon the terms custody/access or define these terms
in any way they wish in their domestic laws; this is unimportant in applying the Convention. The
question to ask under the Convention is whether a parent has "rights of custody" within the
meaning of the Convention. Whatever words are used under the domestic law, does the parent
have "rights relating to the care of the person of the child" or "the right to determine the child's
place of residence?"
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of rights of custody under the Convention. This article points out that the
interpretation of rights of custody adopted by most jurisdictions is
consistent with both liberal and restrictive rules regarding relocation by
the custodial parent.
II. THE CONVENTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION

The Convention's objectives, set forth in Article 1, are "to secure the
prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State," and "to ensure that rights of custody
and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States."3 Article 12 provides that when
a child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in Canada, an order
will be made for return of the child to the country of his or her habitual
residence, unless the application for return has been brought more than a
year after the wrongful removal or retention and the child is now settled
in his or her new environment. 4 Further exceptions to the rule of
automatic return are set out in Articles 13 and 20. 5
Although the Convention protects rights of both custody and access,
it provides for a child's return only when there has been "wrongful"
removal or retention. A removal or retention is "wrongful" only if it is in
breach of rights of custody. 6 Access rights are afforded less protection,
and a parent who has only access rights may not use the Convention to
obtain a return of the child who has been removed by the custodial
parent.
Access rights are not specifically defined in the Convention.
However, Article 5(b) states that '"rights of access' shall include the right
to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the
child's habitual residence." 7 A parent who has only the right to visit and

3. Convention, supra note I, art. I.
4. /d.atart.l2.
5. !d. at arts. 13-20.
6. Article 3 of the Convention provides:
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where: (a) it is
in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body,
either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually
resident immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at the time of removal
or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have
been so exercised but for the removal or retention."

!d.
7.

Convention, supra note I, art. 5(b ).
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be visited by the child will not be entitled to an order for return, but is
entitled to assistance from the Central Authorities under Article 21. 8
In some cases an access parent may be considered to maintain rights
of custody and be entitled to an order that the child be returned. Article
5(a) of the Convention provides that "'rights of custody' shall include
rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the
right to determine the child's place of residence." If the access parent has
more than the right to visit the child and "to take a child for a limited
period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence," and
shares the right to determine the child's place of residence, then the
access parent has "rights of custody" within the meaning of the
Convention.
When the Convention was first drafted, A.E. Anton expressed doubt
on this question:
It is less clear, but the definition of "rights of custody" in Article
5 at least suggests, that the breach of a right simply to give or to
withhold consent to changes in a child's place of residence is not
to be construed as a breach of right of custody in the sense of
Article 3. A suggestion that the definition of "abduction" should
be widened to cover this case was not pursued. 9

However, other early commentary on the Convention clearly
indicated that removal by the custodial parent without the other parent's
consent in violation of an order, agreement or law would violate the
access parent's "rights of custody." John Eekelaar wrote:

8. Article 21 provides:
An application to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise
of tights of access may be presented to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States
in the same way as an application for the return of the child.
The Central Authorities are bound by the obligations of co-operation which are set forth
in Article 7 to promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfilment of any
conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject. The Central Authorities shall
take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.
The Central Authorities, either directly or through intermediaries, may initiate or assist
in the institution of proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights and
securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these rights may be subject.
Convention, supra note I, art. 21. The Convention has no clear provisions to enforce access
rights, and Central Authorities have no mandatory duties in this regard, only an obligation to
promote cooperation. For discussion of the deficiencies of the access enforcement provisions of
the Convention, see Nigel Lowe, Problems Relating to Access Disputes Under the Hague
Convention on International Child Abduction, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. (1994).
9. A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 537, 546 (1981).
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In common law, the term "custody" does not simply mean the
actual possession of the child (this is often referred to as "care
and control") but refers to a bundle of "rights" respecting the
child. These will include the day to day care of the child, but can
also comprehend the rights to determine the child's religion,
education and place of residence. Sometimes these "rights" may
be fragmented and shared between a number of persons, or
between a person and an institution. Now, States may define the
term "custody" in whatever way they choose, but what is
essential for determining their obligations under the Convention
is the definition used in the Convention. This definition is openended in that it specifies rights of custody as including rights
relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular,
the right to determine the child's place of residence (Article 5).
Such rights, by whatever name they might be called in a State's
domestic legal system, are "rights of custody" for the purpose of
the Convention and are protected by it. There is nothing to
suggest that such rights cannot be separated. Hence, if the right
to day to day care is vested in A and the right to determine the
child's place of residence in A and B, both A and B have rights
of custody under the Convention. This may be of crucial
significance if, for example after a divorce, the court grants joint
custody to both parents but care and control to one only. A joint
custodian would normally be entitled to be consulted as to where
the child should live, 10 and if the custodian who has care and
control removes the child without consulting him or her, that is a
wrongful removal. The result would be the same if the court had
specifically stated that a child should not be removed from the
jurisdiction without the consent of one parent (or the court) for,
although the expression "custody" may not have been used, that
parent would possess a right to determine the child's place of
residence which falls within the protection of the Convention. 11

I 0. A parent with ·~oint legal custody" who does not have day to day care and control and
who has expressly given up the right to determine the child's place of residence in an agreement
probably would not have rights of custody within the meaning of the Convention. This view was
expressed in !valdi v. !valdi, 672 A.2d 1226, 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), where the
court said:
Although plaintiff and defendant have joint legal custody under the separation agreement,
the right to custody as contemplated by the Convention consists of 'in particular, the
right to determine the child's place of residence.' Any fair reading of the separation
agreement reveals that plaintiff does not have that right.

!d. (citations omitted).
11. JOHN EEKELAAR,

THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CiVIL ASPECTS OF lNTERNA TIONAL
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Recent commentators, who have had the benefit of reviewing the
cases decided under the Convention, have also concluded that in cases of
non-removal orders, agreements or laws, the access parent does have a
right of custody within the meaning of the Convention. Linda Silberman
reviewed the case law on this issue and concluded that
several cases have provided a gloss as to other types of parenting
arrangements and custodial orders that create custody rights. For
example, when there are restrictions on the movement of the
custodial parent or concepts of joint custody or guardianship, the
Convention appears to offer protection. 12
As the recent commentaries suggest, courts that have addressed this
question have ruled that an access parent with the right to consent to the
child's removal from the jurisdiction has a right of custody within the
meaning of Article 5 of the Convention, because such a parent has "the
right to determine the child's place ofresidence." 13 InC v. C., the parents
consented to an order under which they would have joint guardianship.
The mother would have custody, and neither party could remove the
child from Australia without the consent of the other. The mother
removed the child to England in violation of the consent order. The Court
of Appeal unanimously ruled that the mother had wrongfully removed
the child in violation of the father's rights of custody. Lord Donaldson
M.R. wrote:
We are necessarily concerned with Australian law because we
are bidden by [A]rticle 3 to decide whether the removal of the
child was in breach of "rights of custody" attributed to the father
either jointly or alone under that law, but it matters not in the
least how those rights are described in Australian law. What
matters is whether those rights fall within the Convention
definition of "rights of custody." Equally, it matters not in the
least whether those rights would be regarded as rights of custody
under English law, if they fall within the definition.

CHILD ABDUCTION: EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTATION PREPARED FOR COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS
15-17 (1981) (emphasis added). See also John Eekelaar, Intemational Child Abduction by Parents,
32 U. TORONTO L.J. 281, 309-10 (1982).
12. Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Brief
Overview and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAMILY L.Q. 9, 17 (1994). For a discussion of this issue
in the context of a jurisdiction which has adopted a continuing parental responsibility model
(England and Wales), see ANDREW BAINHAM, CHILDREN- THE MODERN LAW, 591-95 (1993).
13. See, e.g., the English Court of Appeal's decision in C. v. C., [1989] I W.L.R. 654
(C.A. 1989).
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"Custody," as a matter of non-technical English, means "safe
keeping, protection; charge, care, guardianship" (citation
omitted); but "rights of custody" as defined in the Convention
includes a much more precise meaning which will, I apprehend,
usually be decisive of most applications under the Convention.
This is "the right to determine the child's place of residence."
This right may be in the court, the mother, the father, some
caretaking institution, such as a local authority, or it may, as in
this case, be a divided right-in so far as the child is to reside in
Australia, the right being that of the mother; but, in so far as any
question arises as to the child residing outside Australia, it being
a joint right subject always, of course, to the overriding rights of
the court. If anyone, be it an individual or the court or other
institution or a body, has a right to object, and either is not
consulted or refuses consent, the removal will be wrongful within
the meaning of the Convention. 14
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia addressed this
question in 1991, and adopted, with some hesitation, the position of the
English Court of Appeal in C. v. C. 15 The case before it was very similar
to C. v. C.. A consent order granted custody to the wife and access to the
husband. The order included an injunction restraining each of the parties
from removing either of the children from the State of Western Australia
and the Commonwealth of Australia. The wife removed the children. The
court ruled that the husband had rights of custody by virtue of the
injunction, and that the wife's removal was wrongful. The court adopted
C. v. C.'s reasoning, although it stated that interpreting rights of custody
to include an injunction was "something of a quantum leap." 16 The court
gave two reasons for its decision. The first reason was that "uniformity
itself is highly desirable, particularly between common law countries,"
and the second reason was that it was a result "which is in conformity
with the spirit of the Convention which is to ensure that children who are
taken from one country to another wrongfully, in the sense of in breach
of court orders or understood legal rights, are promptly returned to their
country so that their future can properly be determined within that
society." 17

C. v. C., I W.L.R. at 663.
In re Marriage of Jose Garcia and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resins, Appeal No. 52
of 1991 (Full Court of Australia Family Court) (Q.L.).
16. /d.at3.
17. !d. at 4. ·me court added,"! might add a third one perhaps; namely, that there would
be some irony in a situation where the Court of Appeal in England declared the Australian Court
to be one thing and the Australian Court declared it to be another, but one need not pursue that."
14.

15.
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The State of New York adopted the same approach in DavidS. v.
Zamira. 18 This decision was recently cited with approval by the United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Friedrich v. Friedrich:
For a particularly difficult situation, ably resolved, see DavidS.
v. Zamira. The court here held that an order giving the
non-custodial parent visitation rights and restricting the custodial
parent from leaving the country constitutes an order granting
'custodial' rights to both parents under the Hague Convention. 19
The first case arising under the Convention in Israel (which ratified
the Convention on December 1, 1991 and implemented it by statute on
May 20, 1991) also determined that a law restricting a custodial parent's
departure from the country without the access parent's consent gave the
access parent a right of custody within the meaning of the Convention. 20
The custodial mother brought her child to Israel without the father's
knowledge or consent and applied for sole custody. The father lacked
day to day care and control of the child, but had continuing parental
responsibility under French law. The father petitioned the Tel Aviv
District Court for return of the child under the Convention and sought
and obtained sole custody in France. The Israeli court found that bringing
the child to Israel was both a wrongful removal in violation of the
father's rights of custody and a denial of the father's visiting rights.
Foxman v. Paxman, another Israeli decision that confirmed and expanded
on this interpretation of rights of custody, was cited by the Quebec Court
of Appeal in V. W. v. D.S.. 21

Id.

18. 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (fam.Ct. 1991), aff'd In re Schneir, 17 F.L.R. 2001 (NY.A.D.2d
1991). The Family Law Reporter noted that this appeared to be the first ruling in the country by
an appellate court in a case involving the enforcement of the Convention.
19. 78 F.3d 1060, n. 4 (6th Cir. 1996).
20. Pnina Tuma v. Daniel Charles Meshullam, (1992) (Isr.), discussed in Becky Cohen, The
Practice of Israel in Matters Related to International Law, 26 !SR. L. REv. 559, 567-71 (1992).
See Silbennan, supra note 12, at 18. Cohen concludes her discussion of the case by noting at 571
that
the Court recognized the importance of imminent action as a major aim of the
Convention. In view of this aim the Court based its decision on previous decisions made
by the French Courts as well as on facts and information gathered by those Courts
pertaining to this case. The Court also determined that international conventions after
their incorporation into Israeli law should be given a uniform interpretation that conforms
to its interpretation by the other contracting parties.
Cohen at 57 I.
21. Foxman v. Foxman, High Court of the Civil Appeals Court of Israel, 19 November
1992 (C.A. 527/92), cited in V.W. v. D.S., [1993] 58 Q.A.C. 168 (C.A. Que.). The Quebec Court
of Appeal summarized the decision in para. 45, explaining that the parents' first custody/access
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Linda Silberman analyzed several French cases, one of which held
that a custodial mother's removal of a child to France, in violation of a
court order that she remain in England or Wales, was not wrongful
because only the father's rights of acces, not custody rights, were
violated. 22 Silberman further indicated that other French cases, including
an appeals court decision, have ruled that a restriction on movement
creates "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Convention. 23 A
more recent ruling on this issue by a French appeals court was referred to
by the Supreme Court of Canada in its unanimous decision in M.P. v.
G.L.B. 24 In that case, the custodial mother removed the child to France in
violation of a non-removal clause in the parties' court-sanctioned
agreement. The father then applied for a change of custody. The Quebec
Court of Appeal awarded custody to the father and the mother's appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada was subsequently dismissed. In the
meantime the mother applied for variation of their agreement in France,
so she could live with the child in France. The father applied for an order
of return under the Convention, and succeeded after he had obtained
custody in Canada. When the mother appealed this order, the Court of
Appeal ofMontpellier affirmed the order to return the child to Quebec. It
declared on May 9, 1994 that in view of the 1991 agreement not to
remove the child, failure to return the child had been unlawful from
August 13, 1992, the time when the mother was in violation of the nonremoval clause. According to the Canadian Supreme Court in M.P. v.
G.L.B., this judgment may be currently on appeal in the Court of
Causation in France. 25 As it stands, it is another example of a court
interpreting a non-removal clause to give an access parent rights of
custody within the meaning of the Convention.
Courts have concluded that agreements, orders, or laws that prohibit
a child's removal without the access parent's consent create rights of
custody. This approach is sensible for several reasons. First, the words of
the Convention, in particular the words in Article 5 that "rights of
custody shall include ... the right to determine the child's place of

agreement provided for consultation with one another on any major changes or any unusual events
that would be controversial. This agreement was subsequently revised to provide for different
access arrangements, and the consultation provision was omitted from the revised agreement. The
mother left the jurisdiction with the child without consulting the father, although she consulted
with a rabbi prior to her departure. The court considered that the consultation clause was
implicitly included in the revised agreement, and concluded that the father had rights of custody
within the meaning of the Convention.
22. Silberman, supra note 12, at 18 (reporting on Ministere Public v. Mme Y, Trib. Gr. 1nst.
de Perigueux (Mar. 17, 1992)).
23. Silberman, supra note 12, at 18 (citing Minis/ere Public v. Mme B, Cour d'Appel
d'Aix-en-Provence (Mar. 23, 1989)).
24. [1995] 4 S.C.R. 592 (Can.).
25. !d. at 595.
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residence," support this interpretation. 26 Second, this interpretation
accords with the basic premise of the Convention, which is that the state
in which the child is habitually resident should be the place where any
custody disputes are resolved. As Silberman points out:
The State of habitual residence has the most significant interest
in resolving the dispute and will usually be best situated with
information to determine the ultimate merits of any custody
controversy. In addition, parents will be deterred from
unilaterally taking or removing children from their habitual
residences. To that end, countries adhering to the Convention
agree to return children to have all issues of custody decided in
the jurisdiction where the child was habitually resident. 27
Disputes as to whether a custodial parent should be able to relocate with
the child despite an order, agreement, or law prohibiting the move are
custody disputes, and, as such, are properly adjudicated in the country in
which the child habitually resides.
Additionally, this interpretation is consistent with the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This provides that a child shall
not be separated from her or his parents against their will, except when
competent authorities determine that such a separation is necessary for
the best interests of the child. 28 States shall respect the right of the child
who is separated from a parent to maintain contact with her or his parents
on a regular basis, unless it is not in the child's best interest. 29 If an
agreement, order, or law prohibits the child's removal without the access
parent's consent, a custodial parent who wishes to move must obtain a
court order to grant the move, and such an order would be made
according to the child's best interests. 30 If a custodial parent violates an
order, agreement, or law by removing a child and is not ordered to return
the child to have the issue adjudicated in the country of the child's
habitual residence, then, arguably, the child is deprived of her or his
rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In cases where a
non-removal order, agreement, or law is in place, courts should interpret
the Convention so that a custodial parent may not avoid an examination
based on the best interests of the child in the country of the child's

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Convention, supra note I, art. 5.
Silberman, supra note 12, at II.
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 9 (1989).
!d.
Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 134 D.L.R.4th 321 (Can.).
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habitual residence, and to deprive the child of the right to have such a
determination made. 31
Finally, contracting states that have addressed this issue have agreed
on this interpretation of rights of custody. Other states should adopt the
same interpretation, if possible, for the sake of uniformity. Under the
Convention, courts are to determine violations of rights of custody under
the law of the state in which she habitually resided prior to removal or
detention. However, a court is not bound by another jurisdiction's
interpretation of the Convention, and must determine whether a removal
is wrongful based on its own interpretation of the Convention. Under
Article 15 of the Convention, a court may request that an applicant obtain
such an opinion from the state authorities of the child's habitual
residence determining whether wrongful removal under Article 3
occurred. 32 This opinion is intended only to assist the court in which the
application is heard to determine the law of the other contracting state. 33
A court obtaining an Article 15 opinion that a removal is wrongful may
reject that conclusion if it adopts a different interpretation of the
Convention. It would seem that the law of the habitual residence governs
the question of whether the applicant shared the right to determine the
child's place of residence. Whether this right is a "right of custody"
within the meaning of the Convention is determined by the jurisdiction in
which the application is brought.
Despite this freedom to interpret the Convention, courts strive to
uniformly interpret the Convention. Many courts assert their autonomy
in rendering decisions. In C. v. C., for example, Lord Donaldson wrote:
I wish to emphasize the international character of this legislation.
The whole purpose of such a code is to produce a situation in
which the courts of all contracting states may be expected to

31. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Caral L. Finan, Convention on the
Rights of the Child: A Potentially Effective Remedy in Cases of International Child Abduction,
34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1007 (1994).
32. Convention, supra note I, arts. 3, 15.
33. See Lord Donaldson M.R.'s discussion on this point in C. v. S., 2 All E.R. 449, 452
(C.A. 1990):

It cannot, as I see it, have been the intention that the courts of the other contracting state
should be asked to determine the issue of the applicability of art 3 in so far as it turns
on the meaning of the convention itself, because that is something which the courts of
both countries are equally able to determine. Indeed, they would be expected to arrive
at similar determinations. If, unhappily, this did not occur, the court which is being asked
to order the return of the child would be bound to apply its own view of the convention,
particularly where, as here, the convention only takes effect by virtue of a domestic Act
of Parliament.
/d.
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interpret and apply it in similar ways, save m so far as the
national legislatures have decreed otherwise. 34
If courts did not apply this principle of uniform interpretation, the
Convention's efficacy would be diminished, and the commitment to
return children might be weakened by lack of reciprocity on the part of
other states. The effects of non-uniformity may soon be felt due to the
Canadian Supreme Court's decisions in Thomson v. Thomson and V. W. v.
D.S..
A. Thomson v. Thomson

In Thomson, 35 the first Convention case to come before the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Court ordered that a child who had been brought to
Canada by the mother be returned to Scotland. When the mother left
Scotland, an interim custody order existed that included a non-removal
clause. The Supreme Court ruled that the child had been wrongfully
removed because the non-removal clause of the mother's interim custody
order preserved the jurisdiction in the Scottish court to determine the
issue of custody on the merits in a full hearing. Therefore, the Scottish
court became an institution with rights of custody immediately before the
removal of the boy, and the mother's breach of those custody rights
constituted a wrongful removal within the meaning of the Convention. 36
Justice La Forest in his majority judgment, wrote:
It will be observed that I have underlined the purely interim

nature of the mother's custody in the present case. I would not
wish to be understood as saying the approach should be the same
in a situation where a court inserts a non-removal clause in a
permanent order of custody. Such a clause raises quite different
issues. It is usually intended to ensure permanent access to the
non-custodial parent. The right of access is, of course, important
but, as we have seen, it was not intended to be given the same
level of protection by the Convention as custody. The return of a
child in the care of a person having permanent custody will
ordinarily be far more disruptive to the child since the child may
be removed from its habitual place of residence long after the
custody order was made. The situation also has serious

34. C. v. C. at412.
35. Thomson v. Thomson, p 995] 119 D.L.R.4th 253 (Can.).
36. Here the Court was following the reasoning of Sir Stephen Brown in B. v. B., [1993]
2 All E.R. 144 (C.A.) (Eng.) (discussing abduction and custody rights).
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implications for the mobility rights of the custodian( emphasis
added). 37
These obiter comments suggested that Justice La Forest would not
consider an access parent to have rights of custody within the meaning of
the Convention simply because there is a non-removal clause in the
custody order. 38 These comments also suggested that the Scottish court
would not have had rights of custody if the mother's custody order and
the non-removal clause had been final.
Justice La Forest's reasoning is questionable. First, it is not always
easy to distinguish between an interim and a final order, and there may be
uncertainty in having the right to a return order depend on this
distinction. 39 Next, it is unclear that non-removal clauses are designed
only to ensure permanent access rights, as Justice La Forest suggested. 40
John Eekelaar discussed the difference between mere access rights on
one hand, and access rights coupled with a non-removal order or
agreement on the other:
[I]f a parent who has the day-to-day care of the child but who is
under an obligation (whether imposed by court order or
agreement or otherwise) to allow the other parent to visit the
children removes the children, thus rendering it impossible for
the visits to take place, such removal is not wrongful under the
Convention. The reason for this is that disputes about access are
notoriously difficult to unravel (it might be alleged that the
absent parent was visiting very infrequently, or that the children
disliked the visits), and to order the return of the children when
such matters may well be in dispute is to provide too drastic a
remedy. But it must also be remembered that, if the parent with
access rights also has the right to determine where the children
shall live, ... the latter right is a "right of custody" within the
convention and, if breached, may be remedied by return of the
children. It seems right to draw a distinction in this manner
because a parent with the latter right who can be held to be
"actually exercising" it is likely to be more involved with the

37. Thomson, 119 D.L.R.4th at 281.
38. Justice La Forest also has expressed deference to the custodial parent vis a vis the child
on the issue of mobility rights. See R.B. v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,
[1995] 122 D.L.R.4th 1, where Justice La Forest stated "it would be difficult to deny that a parent
can dictate to his or her child the place where he or she will live." !d. at 42.
39. Vaughan Black & Christopher Jones, Thomson v. Thomson, 12 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 321,
329 (1994-95).
40. !d.
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children, and it seems proper that, if any dispute over its exercise
arises, this should be resolved at the place where the children
habitually reside. 41
Justice La Forest, however, failed to consider that an access parent with a
shared right to determine the child's place of residence may be different
from, and entitled to a different remedy than, an access parent without
such a right.
There is yet another problem with Justice La Forest reasoning. If an
agreement, order, or law prohibiting removal of the child from the
jurisdiction without the access parent's consent does not constitute rights
of custody, difficulties arise in determining the rights of many parents
who lack day to day care and control of the child. A parent may have
joint legal custody, but be in the same position as an access parent who
has a shared right to determine the child's place of residence by virtue of
a non-removal clause. Under Justice La Forest's approach it is unclear
whether such a parent would be entitled to a return order. In jurisdictions
that have continuing shared parental responsibility after separation, both
the "custodial" and the "access" parent continue to have the right to
determine the child's residence. Should a parent with "parental
responsibility" but who is in precisely the same position as a Canadian
parent who has an order for access and a non-removal clause be entitled
to an order for return? In fact, Canadian courts have not hesitated to order
the child's return in such cases. 42 There is no apparent reason for
distinguishing between a parent with access and a non-removal clause on
one hand, and a parent who does not live with the child but who has joint
legal custody or parental responsibility on the other. All of these parents
share the right to determine the child's residence and therefore, should
have "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Convention. But if
Justice La Forest's approach were applied consistently, none of these
parents would be considered to have rights of custody.

41. EEKELAAR, supra note II, at 25-26.
42. Chalkley v. Chalkley, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 114 (Man. Q.B.) (dismissing leave to appeal
to Supreme Court of Canada, L'Heureux Dube, J. dissenting). The affidavit of the Official
Solicitor that the applicant had "parental responsibility" under the Children Act 1989 and therefore
"rights of custody" within the meaning of the Convention was accepted without question. The fact
that the child was not residing with the applicant at the time of the removal, and that the
applicant was in the same position as a parent with access and a non-removal clause did not give
concern to the court. ld.

46

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
B.

[Volume 11

v.w. V. D.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada returned to this issue in V. W. v. D.S.. 43
Unfortunately, it adopted the approach suggested by Justice La Forest's
obiter comments in Thomson. The Supreme Court suggested that a right
of non-removal did not create rights of custody in the access mother. At
the conclusion of its analysis it determined that the custodial father's
removal of the child from Maryland, U.S.A., to Quebec, Canada, in
violation of the existing custody/access order, was not wrongful.
The parties in V. W. separated in 1986, and custody and access were
contentious from the outset. In 1987, an order for joint custody with the
mother to have primary care was made. In 1988, custody was varied after
a contested trial. The father was given custody, and the mother was given
supervised access, on the basis of allegations that the mother had
committed acts of satanism and sexual abuse. The trial judge refused to
consider the evidence of sexual abuse, but said that the mother was the
primary cause of whatever disturbance the child was suffering. In 1989,
the father took the child from Maryland to Michigan. The mother then
brought an action in Maryland to enforce and expand her rights of access.
In that proceeding, the father consented to a psychiatric evaluation order,
dated March 13, 1990. However, he had already moved to Quebec with
the child on February 13, 1990 without consulting or warning the mother.
He had also failed to take the child for a scheduled access visit. On
March 22, 1990, the Maryland court issued a contempt order against the
father. On May 8, 1990, the Maryland court, in the absence of the father
and child, granted the mother's application for variation and awarded her
custody. This order was upheld on appeal. 44 On May 6, 1991, the father
applied for custody in Quebec, and the mother responded by demanding
the return of the child under the Convention. The trial judge ordered the
immediate return of the child to Maryland.
The Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, rejecting the
father's arguments that: 1) the Convention did not apply, because he had
a final custody order at the time of the move, and the Convention does
not provide for return of the child to protect access rights; 2) the
Convention application had been brought more that a year after the
child's move to Quebec, and the child was now settled in Quebec; and 3)
there was a grave risk of physical or mental harm if the child was
returned, and the child objected to the return and was mature enough to
have her views taken into account.

43.
44.

[1996] 134 D.L.R.4th 481 (Can.).
Shunk v. Walker, 589 A.2d 1303 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
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The latter two arguments were rejected on the basis of the evidence.
With regard to the father's first argument, the Quebec Court of Appeal
considered that the access arrangements between the parties created a
custody right in the mother, in particular because an implied agreement
existed that the father would not remove the child without the mother's
consent. The Quebec Court of Appeal followed the principles that have
been applied by other jurisdictions in interpreting the Convention, and it
cited and followed the English Court of Appeal's decision in C. v. C..
The Court of Appeal referred accurately to the purposes of the
Convention, and it stressed the importance of a uniform interpretation of
the Convention. The custodial father appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected all of the arguments put
forward by the mother to support her claim that the Convention applied.
It ruled that the child's removal was not wrongful within the meaning of
the Convention, because the father had a final custody order at the time
of the removal, and the mother had only access rights. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument that either the mother or the Maryland court
had rights of custody because of the Maryland court's continuing
jurisdiction to vary the custody order. 45 Although the Quebec legislation
implementing the Convention expands the circumstances under which a
child will be returned to include cases where "proceedings for
determining or modifying the rights of custody have been introduced ...
where the child was habitually resident and the removal or retention
might prevent the execution of the decision to be rendered," 46 the
Supreme Court stated that the proceedings pending in Maryland at the
time of the child's removal were for modifying access rights, not custody
rights, and therefore the mother could not rely on this provision of the
Quebec Act. 47 It was further ruled that there was no wrongful retention
because the mother's ex parte custody order obtained in Maryland after
the child's removal did not confer on the mother rights of custody that
rendered the child's retention in Quebec wrongful. 48 After deciding that
the Convention did not apply to that case, the Supreme Court upheld the
order that the child be returned to Maryland, reasoning that such an order

45. See V.W., 134 D.L.R.4th at 503.
46. Act Respecting the Civil Aspects of International and Interprovincial Child Abduction,
R.S.Q., ch. 12 §1(4) (1984) (Que.).
47. See V.W., 134 D.L.R.4th at 504, 506. This ruling seems questionable in light of the fact
that the proceedings pending in Maryland at the time of the removal did in fact result in a change
of custody. Also, a claim for modification of custody may always be added to a claim for
modification of access, and it seems problematic to make the right to an order for return depend
on whether a claim for modification of custody has already been added.
48. See id. at 505.
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could be made based on the best interests of the child under Quebec's
domestic legislation.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube, who wrote the main opinion, suggested that
an access parent does not have rights of custody, even if the custodial
parent is prohibited from removing the child from the jurisdiction
without the access parent's consent. Although V. W. v. D.S. involved an
implicit non-removal clause, Justice L'Heureux-Dube suggested that
even an explicit non-removal clause would not give the access parent
rights of custody. 49 While acknowledging the ruling in Thomson that in
the case of an interim custody order and a non-removal clause the court
has rights of custody, Justice L'Heureux-Dube stated that, apart from
cases of an interim order restricting a move, a "large and liberal"
interpretation of custody is to be applied. 5° This apparently means that a
removal in violation of a final order restricting a move will not be
considered wrongful within the Convention's meaning. Her Ladyship's
"large and liberal" label of her interpretation of right of custody is
misleading, but apparently indicates that the custodial parent will have
the large and liberal right to remove the child in violation of an order,
agreement, or law. 51 Justice L'Heureux-Dube stated:

49.

Her Ladyship said that

although Thomson did not determine whether an implicit restriction on removing a child
under a court order or statute confers rights of custody within the meaning of the Act on
either the court or the non-custodial parent, this court's limitation of the effect of an
express non-removal clause in a permanent custody order casts serious doubt on the
validity of the respondent's argument.

/d. at 504.
50. Her Ladyship also stated:
Although it is true that an interim custody order combined with an order restricting the
removal of a child might temporarily deprive the person awarded custody of the right to
determine the child's place of residence by making any removal of the child wrongful
within the meaning of s. 3 of the Act, aside from this exception, the large and liberal
interpretation to be given to the concept of custody under the Act is not affected.

!d. at 501.
51. That L'Heureux-Dube labels her own interpretation "large and liberal" is misleading.
Most other courts would classify her interpretation, which excludes access parents, as "narrow."
Her Ladyship, however, made a point of insisting that her approach was "large and liberal" and
that other interpretations were "narrow." She said:
While the Court of Appeal described its interpretation of the concept of custody as
(translation) 'large', it actually adopted a very narrow interpretation in order to find that,
although the respondent had only access rights, she had rights of custody within the
meaning of the Act when the child was removed.

!d. at 502.
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[R]ights of custody within the meaning of the Act cannot be
interpreted in a way that systematically prevents the custodial
parent from exercising all the attributes of custody, in particular
that of choosing the child's place of residence, but, on the
contrary, must be interpreted in a way that protects their
exercise. 52
Justice L'Heureux-Dube has repeatedly expressed her disapprobation of
the notion that access parents should have any decision-making power
with regard to their children or be able to interfere with the decisions of
the custodial parent/ 3 and her opinion in V. W v. D.S. may be seen as an
additional expression of this view. 54
Justice L'Heureux-Dube has tended to assume that the rights and
interests of children are best protected by upholding the exclusive
authority of custodial parents, 55 and has not given attention to conflicts

52. Gordon v. Goertz, [1996]134 D.L.R.4th 321, 354.
53. See, for example, Her Ladyship's dissenting opinion in Young v. Young, [1994] 108
D.L.R.4th 193 (Can.):
[T]he need for continuity generally requires that the custodial parent have the autonomy
to raise the child as he or she sees tit without interference with that authority by the state
or the non-custodial parent, as it is the inability of the custodial parent to sufficiently
protect those interests which poses the real threat to the welfare of the child.
!d. at 214.
54. It would perhaps be clearer to say that L'Heureux-Dube's interpretation of "rights of
custody" is "narrow" in the sense that only a narrow range of people and institutions would meet
her test, and that her notion of the rights of custodial parents is "large" because in her view
custodial parents generally have all the rights and responsibilities relating to the child-rearing
decisions and access parents generally have no such rights and responsibilities, and limited power
to challenge the decisions of the custodial parent. She states: "[T]he Civil Code of Quebec has
adopted a liberal concept of custody - one that does not include access rights - that gives the
custodian the exclusive power to make all decisions in respect of the child, including the choice
of the child's place of residence." V.W., 134 D.L.R.4th at 512.
In L'Heureux-Dube J.'s minority opinion in Gordon, 134 D.L.R.4th at 354, there is another
misleading statement on this issue:

As this Court stressed in [V W. v. D.S.], it is significant that the international commumty
has adopted a wide concept of custody under the Convention which entails the right to
determine the place of residence of a child unless specifically taken away by such means
as an explicit non-removal clause included in an interim custody order.
!d. This statement is misleading because the "international community" has adopted an
interpretation of "rights of custody" that is different from that of Her Ladyship and that includes
an access parent who has a right under an agreement, order, or law to object to the removal of
the child. Her Ladyship did not refer to any of the decisions of the "international community" on
this issue, so her attribution of her own distinctive interpretation of "rights of custody" to the
"international community" is surprising.
55. See id. at 222: "It is precisely to ensure the best interests of the child that the decisionmaking power is granted to the custodial parent, as that person is uniquely situated to assess,
understand, ensure and promote the needs of the child." !d.
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between the rights and interests of the custodial parent and the child in
"private" custody/access disputes. In V. W v. D.S., the Court failed to
consider the implications of Justice L'Heureux-Dube's distinctive
interpretation of rights of custody. Her interpretation is that the issue of
removal must be determined in the state of the child's habitual residence
based on her best interests, in cases where the access parent has a nonremoval clause and does not consent to removal.
Contrary to most courts addressing this question (but understandably,
given her distinctive views on the Convention), Justice L'Heureux-Dube
did not mention the desirability of uniform interpretation of the
Convention, and indeed decisions by other jurisdictions were not cited or
addressed in her opinion. Even the decisions cited by the Quebec Court
of Appeal in this case were passed over. Although several articles are
cited by Her Ladyship, she unfortunately refrained from citing or
responding to the portions of these authorities that state that an order,
agreement, or law prohibiting a child's removal without the access
parent's consent constitutes rights of custody.
V. W v. D.S. was wrongly decided with regard to the issue of whether
removal of a child in violation of an agreement, order, or law is wrongful
within the meaning of the Convention. Perhaps the judgment will be
taken as a precedent only with regard to its specific fact situation.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada's decision was unanimous, six
justices concurred with Justice L'Heureux-Dube, subject to a reservation
as to Her Ladyship's views of custodial parents' rights and obligations.
Because Justice L'Heureux-Dube's opinion was based on her views of
custodial parents' rights and obligations, the reservation expressed by six
justices leaves some uncertainty as to the judgment's authority. Also,
V. W v. D.S. involved an implicit, rather than an explicit, prohibition
against removing the child. It is possible that courts will accept that
where there is an explicit prohibition, the access parent does have rights
of custody. Justice L'Heureux-Dube's opinion seems to reject that
possibility, but her comments on that issue are obiter dicta.

C. The Relocation Issue
Justices La Forest and L'Heureux-Dube expressed their support for
the "mobility rights" of the custodial parent in Thomson and in V. W v.
D.S., and did so again, more directly, in Gordon v. Goertz, 56 which was

56. Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 134 D.L.R.4th 321. The Ontario Court of Appeal applied this
decision in Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, [1996] 136 D.L.R.4th 577 (C.A. Ont.), and refused to
allow a custodial mother to move with the children to Scotland. The dissent indicated that there
is some uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of Gordon and continuing disagreement as to
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heard and decided along with V. W v. D.S.. Gordon was not a Convention
case, but rather a relocation case. The issue of relocation is governed by
domestic legislation, either the federal Divorce Act57 or the relevant
provincial custody/access legislation. In relocation cases, the issue is
whether the custodial parent should be permitted to move with the child,
and in Gordon the Supreme Court of Canada considered the principles
that should be applied in relocation cases.
The standard to be applied to relocation cases has been particularly
controversial in Canada over the past year, since the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision in MacGyver v. Richards. 58 In that case the custodial
mother was permitted to relocate with her child in order to join her new
partner, a corporal in the Armed Forces, who was then posted to Tacoma,
Washington. The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal said that, while
the test for determining issues relating to custody and access was the best
interests of the child, a presumptive deference should be given to the
decisions of the custodial parent. 59 Some Canadian courts accepted the
"presumptive deference" approach, but others adopted the test enunciated
in an earlier decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, Carter v. Brooks .60
This was the authoritative mobility rights case in Ontario prior to
MacGyver. In Carter, a different panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal
stated that the sole governing principle was the best interests of the child,
which should be determined by considering all relevant factors, without
the application of any presumptions.
In Gordon, the court unanimously decided that the mother should
retain custody in Australia, with a modification of the father's access
rights, although the Canadian Supreme Court was split on which test
should be applied. Seven of the nine justices rejected the "presumptive
deference" approach and endorsed the Carter approach. The majority
stated that the custodial parent's views on relocation are entitled to a
great deal of respect, but that the issue should be decided according to the
child's best interest after accounting for all relevant factors. This
approach avoided any presumptions. 61 Justice La Forest concurred with

the best approach to "mobility rights" cases. Woodhouse at 599.
57. Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3 (1985) (Can.).
58. MacGyver v. Richards, [1995] 123 D.L.R.4th 562 (C.A. Ont.).
59. Justice Abella, for the majority, reasoned that there should be "particular sensitivity and
a presumptive deference to the needs of the responsible custodial parent who, in the final analysis,
lives the reality, not the speculation, of decisions dealing with the incidents of custody." !d. at
571.
60. Carter v. Brooks, [1990] 77 D.L.R.4th 45 (C.A. Ont.).
61. The majority summarized the principles to apply in relocation disputes in Gordon, 134
D.L.R.4th at 341-42:
I. The parent applying for a change in the custody or access order must meet the
threshold requirement of demonstrating a material change in the circumstances affecting
the child.
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Justice L'Heureux-Dube's minority opinion that the presumptive
deference approach should be adopted. Justices La Forest and
L'Heureux-Dube are more protective of the custodial parent's mobility
rights than is the majority of the Supreme Court. Their opinions in
Thomson and in V. W. v. D.S. on the proper interpretation of rights of
custody may have flowed from their distinctive views on the rights of
custodial parents, leading them to opinions that are inconsistent with
those of other contracting states and which do not support the
Convention's objectives.
Following the precedents set by other jurisdictions as to the
interpretation of rights of custody is not necessarily inconsistent with
strong support for mobility rights of custodial parents. If a custodial
parent violates an order, agreement, or law by removing a child and is
ordered to return the child, the relocation issue will then be determined in
the state of the child's habitual residence, which is the most appropriate

2. If the threshold is met, the judge on the application must embark on a fresh
inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child, having regard to all the relevant
circumstances relating to the child's needs and the ability of the respective parents to
satisfy them.
3. This inquiry in based on the findings of the judge who made the previous order
and evidence of the new circumstances.
4. The inquiry does not begin with a legal presumption in favour of the custodial
parent, although the custodial parent's views are entitled to great respect.
5. Each case turns on its own unique circumstances. The only issue is the best
interest of the child in the particular circumstances of the case.
6. The focus is on the best interests of the child, not the interests and rights of the
parents.
7. More particularly, the judge should consider, inter alia: a) the existing custody
arrangement and the relationship between the child and the custodial parent; b) the
existing access arrangement and the relationship between the child and the access parent;
c) the desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents; d) the views
of the child; e) the custodial parent's reason for moving, only in the exceptional case
where it is relevant to that parent's ability to meet the needs of the child; [)disruption
to the child of a change in custody; g) disruption to the child consequent on removal
from family, schools, and the community he or she has come to know.
In the end, the importance of the child remaining with the parent to whose custody
it has become accustomed in the new location must be weighed against the continuance
of full contact with the child's access parent, its extended family and its community. The
ultimate question in every case is this: what is in the best interests of the child in all the
circumstances, old as well as new?

!d. Appellate courts in other North American jurisdictions have recently addressed the issue of
relocation, and, as in Canada, a central concern has been whether there should be a presumption
against allowing a move, a presumption in favor of allowing a move, or a best interests test with
no presumptions. See. e.g., these U.S. decisions: In reMarriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal.
1996); In re Tropea, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1996); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996).
The approach of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gordon v. Goertz resembles
that of the Court of Appeals of New York, which said: "[E]ach relocation request must be
considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances
and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best
interests of the child." Tropea, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
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forum. That state may well argue that it is generally in the child's best
interest to allow the custodial parent to move as she or he sees fit.
Ordering the child's return ensures that the decision is taken in the
country of the child's habitual residence. This presumably discourages
violations of the order, agreement, or law that prohibits a unilateral move.
If the country of the child's habitual residence does not readily allow
moves, the custodial parent may indeed be frustrated. But if the
Convention is not applied to ensure that the decision is taken in the
country of the child's habitual residence, the custodial parent may be
encouraged to violate the non-removal order, agreement, law, and to
"forum shop," a practice that the Convention was intended to prevent.
Ill. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted rights of custody,
wrongful removal, and wrongful retention more narrowly than courts in
other jurisdictions. Parents, particularly custodial parents who violate a
non-removal agreement, order, or law, will find a friendlier reception in
Canada than in other contracting states. In Canada they will less likely be
ordered to return the child to the country of the child's habitual residence.
The Canadian Supreme Court's interpretation of the Convention has been
largely the work of two justices, whose expressed concern for the
mobility rights of custodial parents seems to underpin their approach to
interpretation of the Convention. Their opinion that non-removal clauses,
agreements, and laws do not create rights of custody in the access parent
is problematic because it does not conform with the language or
objectives of the Convention. It does not respect the right of the child to
have the issue of removal determined in the country of the habitual
residence, and it differs from the interpretation of other contracting
states. The Supreme Court's failure to attend to the principle of uniform
interpretation is of particular concern, not because Canada must
automatically follow the lead of other jurisdictions, but because the Court
did not even address the relevant international precedents, much less
provide a reasoned rejection of them. It is hoped that V W. v. D.S. will be
applied restrictively, so that at least explicit non-removal orders,
agreements, or laws will ground a claim for return of the child.

